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1. Exposition of the theory of 'consumer' sovereignty 
1.1. Introduction 
'Consumer sovereignty' is a common but controversial term in political 
econoray. It occurs in every textbook on economie theory and nearly 
every economist has a ready opinion on the subject, usually without 
having delved too deeply into its fuil meaning and implications. 
The term was coined in the 1930's by the South African economist W.H. 
Hutt, who said it was suggested to him by the Dutch adage: 'The 
customer is king'1). It was rapidly adopted into neo-classsical 
economie vocabulary, but soon gave rise to misunderstandings, as well 
as some more fundamental controversies which have lasted until 
today2). On account of the criticism the concept has fallen somewhat 
into disfavour over the past two decades. The main purpose of this 
paper is to enquire whether this neglect, if not outright rejection, 
of the concept is merited. 
We shall argue that the traditional term is actually a misnomer, the 
misleading denotation of the fundamental principle underlying market 
and democratie political allocation processes and their institutions. 
As a more accurate name for this principle we shall suggest the term 
'the economie sovereignty of the individual', which is composed of 
three paxts: consumer and factor owner sovereignty which rule market 
allocation, and voter sovereignty which governs democratie budget 
allocation. This principle is vital to the understanding and ethical 
justification of these two allocation systems, which characterise 
democratie market economies. The rejection of 'consumer sovereignty' 
leaves the theory of market and budget allocation without a normative 
basis. It must then be replaced by some other allocation principle, 
but far more serious objections can be raised against its logical 
alternative: 'leaders' sovereignty'. The ethical and theoretical 
issues involved in the controversy over 'consumer sovereignty' are 
important enough to warrant serious analysis. 
In this paper we shall: 
- define the allocation principle meant by 'consumer sovereignty' more 
precisely, especially the relationship between consumer, factor 
owner and voter sovereignty, and suggest the comprehensive term 
'economie sovereignty of the individual', 
- describe the ethical foundations of this concept, 
- list all the points of criticism against 'consumer sovereignty' and 
defend the principle on each point, 
- evaluate the controversy and its relevance for economie theory and 
for economie policy in eontemporary market economies. 
1.2. The traditional concept of 'consumer' sovereignty 
Every allocation of scarce resources must be made according to some 
particular set of human preferences. In programming models for 
instance, such a set of preferences determines the objective function 
to be maximised. Consumer sovereignty is one of the conceivable 
2 
principles which state according to whose, or which, particular set of 
preferences the entire allocation process should function. It says 
who determines the goals of the economy and also (if we know what 
the preferences of this decision-maker are) what these goals will 
be. This principle is not unique, nor is it exogenously giv'en to a 
society. It is consciously chosen from among several alternatives, the 
choice being justified by a number of value-judgements deriving from 
the ethics of the society in question. 
Taken literally, the term means that the preferences of the final con-
sumers determine the allocation of all resources in an economy. In the 
first place they determine the allocation of all final goods and ser-
vices (the Austrian economist Karl Menger's 'first' or 'lower' order 
goods). However, as the demand for intermediate goods, raw materials 
and the factors of production is a derived demand, they also determine 
the allocation of all second, third and other 'higher' order goods. 
This conception has been strongly influenced by the Austrian School of 
economics, which stresses the decisive role of final consumer demand, 
and hence of subjective factors, in the entire economie process. 
The allocation principle of consumer sovereignty can be used in a 
normative or in a positive sense. Used normatively, it means that con-
sumer preferences should determine the allocation process, regard-
less of the fact whether this is indeed the case in any existing 
economy. Used in the positive sense it states that the allocation in a 
particular economy J^ s governed by the preferences of the consumers, 
regardless of. whether this is eonsidered to be a good thing or not, 
Normative statements on consumer sovereignty are personal value 
judgements, whereas positive statements about it can in principle be 
verified by an appeal to the facts. The distinction between the two 
usages of the term is important, as we shall see that certain critics 
reject it on positive grounds ('it does not exist in reality'), 
whereas others do so on normative grounds ('it ought not exist, 
neither in theory nor in practice'). 
Before discussing some early critism of this literal view of 'con-
sumer' sovereignty and the extensions of the concept this led to, we 
must first consider its ethical basis. 
1.3. The ethical basis of consumer sovereignty 
The normative meaning of the traditional principle of consumer 
sovereignty is: 
the goal of the entire economie process should be the 
satisfaction of the preferences of the individual con-
sumers, as they are manifested by the consumers them-
selves. 
The crucial elements in this definition are a) the preferences of the 
individual consumers are decisive and b) these preferences are what 
they themselves manifest them to be. The choice of this set of deci-
sion-makers and their preferences is justified by three complementary 
value judgements, which together form the ethics or 'ideology' of 
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own demand for justice or defense! Defined in this way, the 
maximisation of individual welfare also raaximises social welfare. 
The false idea that certain collective entities such as 'society' 
have 'social wants' of their own has taken deep root in modern 
economics. It has led to a widespread rejection of normative 
individualisra and to attacks on the principle of consumer 
sovereignty. 
iii) The third value judgeraent is known as 'subjectivlsnr'. It says 
that the preferences for the individuals are what they them-
selves manifest them to be. Their precise content must be 
determined by the individuals themselves. The subjectivist ethic 
can be expressed in a stronger or a weaker formulation. The 
stronger, 'classic', axiom is: 'No-one knows better t'han the 
individual himself what is good for him'. The weaker axiom is: 
'If the individual does not know what is good for him, then ex 
ante no-one else knows categorically better'. The individual 
himself is the best judge of nis own interests and if he is not, 
no-one else knows categorically better. The individual must even 
be given the freedom to take what may afterwards prove to have 
been wrong decisions, as only he himself can judge whether they 
were wrong or not. 
All three value judgements are complementary and necessary, both to 
justify the concept of consumer sovereignty and to specify its content 
for operational uses. Together they form a compound ethic which we can 
call 'subjectivist individualism'. * 'Consumer sovereignty' actually 
is an imprecise term for denoting the sovereignty of subjectivist-
individualist ethics. 
The acceptance of subjectivist-individualist ethics does not in 
principle predetermine the choice of certain social institutions to 
effectuate them. It is a matter of choice for the individuals 
concerned whether they want to effectuate their preferences by means 
of the market mechanism, bureaucracy, tradition or some other means. 
It only demands that such institutions. should maximise the welfare of 
the individuals, as they define it themselves. Accordingly Rothenberg 
uses the concept of consumer sovereignty as a normative criterion for 
judging the efficacy of social institutions: '... we should take the 
degree of fulfillment of consumers' wants ... as a criterion for 
evaluating the social desirability of the various public policies or 
institutional structures which give rise to them'7). 
1.4. Factor owner sovereignty 
The original view of consumer sovereignty as being solely concerned 
with the preferences of the consumers in the literal sense of the word 
was immediately critised by Fraser. He rejected Hutt's implicit 
suggestion that the preferences on the demand side of the market were 
more important than those on the supply sidè. '... the amount that is 
produced of any commodity and the value at which it sells depend in 
principle as much upon the willingness of the factor owners to provide 
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the necessary resources for their production as upon the willingness 
of the consumers to buy and pay for them. ... the ultiraate power rests 
not with consumers as such, but with the men and women who are 
potentially consumers and producers, and who can decide ... whether to 
be both or neither'8). Opposite to the sovereignty of the consumer 
stands that of the owners of the factors of production, which includes 
the workers as the owners of the production factor labour. The alloca-
tion of all resources is determined by the interaction of their con-
flicting preferences. P.J.D. Wiles coined the term 'worker sovereign-
ty' for the preferences and power of the factor owners and says that 
in a market economy 'Consumer's sovereignty ... usually implies 
'worker's sovereignty' as well. ... consumer's sovereignty unopposed 
by worker's sovereignty would be a curious form of tyranny, over man 
in one of his aspects by himself in another of his aspects'9). 
Hutt defended his use of the term by saying that Fraser misinterpreted 
the word 'consumer'. If factor owners have their own preferences 
concerning the use of their property, they too must be regarded as 
'consumers' of the services of these factors10). Thus Fraser and 
Hutt agree: 'consumer' sovereignty also includes the sovereignty of 
the factor owners over their means of production. It is a matter of 
terminology whether one speaks of consumer sovereignty (including that 
of the factor owners), or of a separate but equal 'factor owners'' 
sovereignty like Wiles. We shall follow the convention established by 
Hutt and speak of''consumer' sovereignty when in fact the sovereignty 
of both sides of the market is meant. M. Rothbard has coined the term 
'the sovereignty of...the individual in the market' or 'individual self-
sovereignty in the market' for this dual sovereignty of each economie 
agent11'. This term is an exact description of the combined 
sovereignty of the consumers and the factor owners in their market 
transactions. It stands in useful contrast to the sovereignty of these 
same individuals in their political capacity as voters in the 
political decision-making process. However, it lacks familiarity and 
for this reason we shall continue to speak of 'consumer' sovereignty 
when meaning this combined sovereignty of consumers and factor owners. 
.5. Voter sovereignty 
The second source of misunderstanding is the close historical associa-
tion of consumer sovereignty with the market mechanism as a means for 
effectuating it. Many critics believe that it only applies to market 
allocation, where the individual economie agents strive to realise 
their aims by means of individual decision-making12). There is some 
reason for this belief, as the concept was most eagerly espoused and 
defended by libertarian economists, who pleaded for the free market. 
This has caused an unfortunate confusion between the allocation 
principle meant by the concept (the sovereignty of subjectivist-
individualist ethics), and the efficacy of the market as a means of 
satisfying all human wants. The well-known failures of the market to 
provide Pareto-optimal allocations in cases of pure collective goods, 
externalities and interdependencies, have' turned the concept of 
consumer sovereignty into a kind of 'straw man', an easy target for 
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its opponents (see criticisims A 1 i - iii furter). I£ the alloca-
tion principle meant by consumer sovereignty should only apply to the 
market raechanism, with its cases of market failure, then it should be 
rejected as a normative prescription on its own normative grounds» As 
a positive statement it is then evidently false, as collective goods 
are provided and externalities corrected in every real-life economy. 
This misunderstanding is also caused by the literal interpretation of 
the word 'consumer', which suggests that only the preferences 
individually expressed on the market are decisive. This is wrong: the 
principle means the sovereignty of the subjective preferences of the 
individuals irrespective of how and by means of which institutions 
they are effectuated. The market is only one of the possible 
mechanisms for doing this and must be judged in terms of its 
instrumental efficacy. In cases ' of market failure some individuals 
find it impossible to realise their aims through individual decision-
making on the market, so they try to do so through collective 
decision-making in the political process. They will manifest their 
economie preferences in their political capacity as voters and try to 
realise their aims through. government intervention. This possiblity 
extends the sovereignty of subjective individual preferences to the 
political decison-making over the economy. Already in 1934 Hutt coined 
the term 'elector's sovereignty', which he said governed the 
allocation of collective goods in a democracy1 3). American authors 
later introduced the term 'citizen' or 'voter sovereignty' to denote 
the same concept. Voter sovereignty is democratie collective decision-
making under some sort of majority rule. It exists when the political 
decisions eoncerning the economy are made by at least the -simple 
majority of the voters„ Hc Gintis expresses this in normative termss 
"... state action ... must reflect some democratie aggregation of 
individual preferences'^). Voter sovereignty is the economie ver-
sion of the 'instrumental' state (as opposed to the 'organic' state) : 
the state has no preferences of its own and merely serves to execute 
the will of the majority of its citizens. '... the government may have 
no substantive goals of its own other than to enable consumers to 
arrive at a Pareto-optimal point'15). Less stringently formulated, 
it means that if politicians and officials have preferences of their 
own, they are unable to pursue them at the expense of voter prefer-
ences. It would take us too far to go into the host of problems raised 
by this principal - agent relationship (see further criticism 
A 3 ü i ) . The normative concept is clear: all government intervention 
must correspond to the aggregated preferences of the majority of the 
citizens, as they are manifested in the democratie voting process. 
Despite a number of differences, voter sovereignty is to the political 
allocation process what consumer sovereignty is to the marketl6)o 
Both are institutional means whereby individuals seek to implement 
their personal preferences. On the market they do this through 
individual decision-making, with the resulting decisions binding the 
contracting parties only; whereas in the political process they do so 
by collective decision-making, with the resulting decisions binding 
for all citizens. Under both mechanisms there will be individuals who 
are unable to realise their aims. In the market these are people with 
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insufficiënt purehasing power, whereas in the politioal process these 
are minority voters who get overruled. Neither mechanism is able to 
achieve the goals of all people, which is the essence of economie 
choice. Losers under the one system will strive to have the decision-
making transferred to the other, if they believe that they will be 
more successful there. The choice of the decision-making mechanism 
itself must for each issue be decided on the basis of the individuals' 
preferences. 
For collective goods voter sovereignty serves as a necessary comple-
ment to consumer sovereignty, but for externalities it functions as a 
substitute for it. In Hutt's words: '... electors' sovereignty is ... 
both subsidiary to, and ... the essential alternative to consumers' 
sovereignty. ... Electors' sovereignty and consumers' sovereignty 
under democratie institutions are complementary17). This means that 
government intervention under voter sovereignty is not the suppres-
sion of individual preferences by collective preferences, as is often 
and erroneously stated. It is the substitution of collective decision-
making on the basis of individual preferences for individual decision-
making on the same basis (which need not be the same preferences). 
Voter sovereignty does not violate subjectivist-individualist ethics -
on the contrary, it is even necessary to allow all individuals to 
manifest all their preferences. In the words of W. Baumol: 'The 
purpose of government intervention ... is to permit consumers' sover-
eignty to operate undistorted, not to suppress it. ... In this event 
the absence of (government intervention) may be construed to result 
in a vitiation of consumer sovereignty," since the individual consumer 
is by himself in no position to obtain the object he desires'^), 
The economie sovereignty of the individual 
We now have three forms which the rule of subjective individual 
preferences over the economy can take: consumer and factor owner 
sovereignty, which together govern the market; and voter sovereignty, 
which rules the democratie political process. The combination of these 
three forms we shall call the 'economie sovereignty of the individual' 
19). This is the true meaning of the term 'consumer sovereignty'. It 
is this sovereignty of the individual that the proponents of consumer 
sovereignty have in mind when they defend their inaccurately-named 
concept against its detractors. It is a much broader concept than 
'consumer' sovereignty, as it also comprises voter sovereignty and 
therefore all forms of democratie government intervention in the 
economy. It is only identical with literal consumer sovereignty in 
general equilibrium models, where all collective" goods and externali-
ties are postulated away. But it is compatible with a considerable 
degree of suppression of consumer and factor owner sovereignty, as 
long as the condition of voter sovereignty is maintained. 
The relationships between the three forms of individual sovereignty 
are shown in the diagram. Consumer sovereignty in the literal sense 
stands on a par with factor owner sovereignty. As far as the prineiple 
of individual sovereignty is concerned, it is immaterial whether and 
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to what extent the one side of the market dominates the other (see 
also criticism A 1 iv). Voter sovereignty dominates both other forms 
of individual sovereignty and determines whether and to what extent 
they are allowed to exist. It does so because political power is the 
suprème form of power in any society. As a hypothetical extreme case, 
the economie sovereignty of the individual could conceivably exist 
without either consumer or factor owner sovereignty (this means that 
all markets have been abolished), as long as voter sovereignty is 
maintained. Such a system would seem to be the ideal of all the socia-
list critics of consumer sovereignty: all individual decision-making 
by means of markets has been abolished and all economie decisions are 
made collectively by democratie political organs and executed through 
comprehensive national plans. Such a system, while conceivable, would 
hardly be Pareto-optimal. Without adopting the arguments of liber-
tarian authors such as Von Mises and Von Hayek, one can say that Pare-
tian welfare losses will increase with every further measure suppres-
sing the market mechanism once a certain (but apriori unspecifiable) 
degree of political allocation has been reached. Various' instances of 
'government failure' will become more common and cause greater losses 
of potential welfare as the role of the market is reduced further. The 
principle of the economie sovereignty of the individual gives no 
definite rules concerning which areas of decision-making should be 
left to consumer and factor owner sovereignty and which to voter 
sovereignty, but the relative efficacy of the respective allocation 
mechanisms is decisive here. 
The only logical alternative to the economie sovereignty of the 
individual is lts eounterpole, which is variously called 'state', 
"planners"' or 'leaders' sovereignty'20)e This is easiest defined as 
the opposite of the subjectivist-individualist eoncepts. The economie 
process is then not determined by the preferences of the majority of 
the individuals, as manifested in the market or the democratie politi-
cal process, but by those of the political authorities or 'planners' 
for a society (in the ultimate decision-making sense of the word). The 
political leaders have their own preferences, which differ from those 
of the citizens. They implement them by suppressing those of the 
citizens, in both their market and electoral manifestations. Only when 
the allocation process is determined by leaders' or planners' prefer-
ences can we speak of the suppression of the economie sovereignty of 
the individual and of 'consumer' sovereignty (properly defined). 
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The relat ionships between the kinds of sovereignty 
Hol i s t io 
l ave l s 
P o l i t i c a l 
level : 
aconomic 
l eve l : 
Economie sovereignty 
of the ind iv idua l • 
Voter sovereignty 
Consumer 
sovereignty 
<-> 
Factor owner 
sovereignty 
State sovereignty; 
Leaders' sovereignty 
Consumer 
rationing 
or 
Consumer free-
dom of choice 
Labeur con-
scription 
or 
Worker free-
dom of choice 
Under leaders' sovereignty there can at best only be 'consumers' 
freedom of choice', which is not the same thing as consumer 
sovereignty in the literal sense. It means that the leaders determine 
which consumer goods should be produced and in which quantiti.es, 
varieties and qualities, according to their own personal preferences -
i.e. what they proclaim to be 'good' for their citizens. These goods 
are then offered to the consumers (who have been paid money ineomes) 
at market-clearing prices. This will require the taxation of some 
goods and the subsidisation of others, depending on the quantities 
offered in relation to consumer demand and the respective production 
costs. At its worst, leaders' sovereignty means consumer rationing on 
the basis of norms set by bureaucrats. There exist a number of 
contributions to a comprehensive theory of planners' or leaders' 
preferences and sovereignty21 ). We shall return to the subject of 
leaders' sovereignty in the conclusion of this article, when 
discussing the implications of abolishing consumer sovereignty. 
Critique and defense of the economie sovereignty of the individual 
We saw that the concept of the economie sovereignty of the individual 
can be used as a normative prescription or as a positive statement. 
Criticism of it also takes a normative or positive form, by averring 
either that it ought not exist, or that it does not exist in particu-
lar economies or economie systems. We shall discuss the critique under 
these two headings and distinguish between consumer, factor owner and 
voter sovereignty. After each point of critique we shall formulate the 
defense offered by its proponents. 
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A. The economie sovereignty of the individual as a positive concept 
Used in this way the concept says that a combination of consumer, 
factor owner and voter sovereignty factually exists in certain econo-
raies. The allocation of resources occurs according to the subjective 
preferences of individual people in their economie roles as consumers 
and factor owners (e„g. as workers) and in their political capaeity as 
voters. This is said of Western market economies, so that criticism of 
the concept often is a critique of capitalism as it exists in Western 
countries. 
A 1: Critique and defense of consumer sovereignty as a positive 
concept 
Criticism of the positive concept usually assumes one of two forms. 
Some critics" say that it does not factually exist in Western market 
economies and point out various kinds of market failurê with the re-
sulting government intervention. Others maintain that the preferences 
which govern consumer behaviour are not their real or true preferen-
ces, but false ones that the producers have manipulated them into 
having. As a result even pure free raarket allocation is not governed 
by true consumer sovereignty, as the consumer is not really 
'sovereign'. 
A 1 (1); Government intervention - collective goods and services 
Critique; The market mechanism cannot provide pure collective goods 
on account of their characteristic of non-exclusivity and the 
resulting 'free rider' problem. Such goods are provided on a planned 
basis by government agencies. Their allocation is not determined by 
consumer sovereignty. 
Defense; Consumer sovereignty in the literal sense of the word does 
not apply to collective goods and services. But in a democracy their 
allocation is governed by voter sovereignty, which is the extension of 
consumer sovereignty to political decision-making. Therefore it is 
still determined by subjective individual preferences, as manifested 
in the voting proeess, and by the same ethical principles as underlie 
consumer sovereignty. 
A 1 (ii): Government intervention - regulation of the market 
Critique; There are innumerable cases in which laws and regulations 
restrict the free operation of the market mechanism. One case is that 
of various categories of persons who are generally not considered to 
be the best judges of their own interests, such as minors, addicts and 
the feeble-minded. Laws prevent them from *effectuating their preferen-
ces by entering into valid contracts. A second category consists of 
certain goods or services which laws compel all citizens to consume, 
even when they may not want to, such as inoculation against epidemie 
diseases, corapulsory education for children, motor car insurance, etc. 
Anyone who does not want to consume the good in question is not 
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considered to be the best judge of his own interests. A third case is 
that of certain goods for which the individual eonsumer is considered 
to be incapable of judging the quality or safety adequately, or where 
his faulty judgement may have serious consequences. Here government 
agencies prescribe and enforce health, safety and quality standards. 
In all three categories there is no free market allocation and no 
eonsumer sovereignty. 
Defense: Again, in a democracy all laws and regulations restricting 
the free operation of the market are made by democratically-elected 
legislative bodies and their intervention conforms to voter 
sovereignty. 
A 1 (iii); Government intervention - merit and demerit goods 
Critique: Certain goods or services are said to have important ex-
ternal effects, so that their social utility or cost is greater/smal-
ler than their private utility or costs. From the point of social 
welfare the free market produces either to little or too much of such 
goods. By paying a subsidy to the producers or the consumers the 
government can increase the quantity produced of a good with positive 
external effects, until its private marginal costs equal its social 
marginal utility. For goods with negative external effects taxes can 
raise the private marginal costs and lead to a reduction of the 
quantities produced. The subsidies or taxes are said to internalise 
the external effects. R. Musgrave coined the term 'merit' and 
'demerit' goods for such goods22), The subsidies on merit goods may 
be so high as to make them available free of charge. This has led to 
some confusion between merit goods and collective goods proper. Many 
so-called 'collective' goods are strictly speaking merit goods, such 
as subsidised or free education, public transport, medical services or 
libraries. In theory the distinction is clear: collective goods are 
non-exclusive in consumption, whereas merit goods have positive exter-
nal effects. Critics of eonsumer sovereignty say that it does not 
apply to merit or demerit goods, as their allocation is determined by 
public policy through subsidies and taxes. 
Defense; Literal eonsumer sovereignty does not apply to the taxed or 
subsidised part of the production of merit or demerit goods. As with 
collective goods, this part is determined by voter sovereignty and is 
therefore not in conflict with eonsumer sovereignty in the wider sense 
of the word. 
In a controversy over merit wants and goods some authors defined the 
concept as the deliberate paternalistic or dictatorial 'correction' by 
the state (i.e. the politicians in command of the coercive powers of 
the state) of the 'incorrect' preferences of the citizens23). We 
then have two different definitions of 'merit' wants and goods: 
- those goods that under voter sovereignty are thought to have a 
greater social than private marginal utility. In subsidising their 
production voter sovereignty overrules eonsumer sovereignty. As both 
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are aspects of the economie sovereignty of the individual, the 
existence of such merit goods does not violate subjectivist-
individualist ethics. 
- those goods that ruling authorities proclaim to possess a greater 
social than private marginal utility, i.e. that they want to have 
produced in a greater quantity than the market would provide. In 
subsidising their production they overrule both consumer and voter 
sovereignty. They suppress the preferences of the majority of the 
citizens and impose their own preferences as being 'meritorious'. In 
this definition 'merit' goods are incompatible with the economie 
sovereignty of the individual24)m 
To avoid confusion the term 'merit .goods' should be reserved for goods 
of the first definition, where voter sovereignty exists. The wants 
behind the second category of goods should be called "planners"' or 
"leaders' preferences", which determine the allocation under a regime 
of "leaders' sovereignty". Another way of ascertaining the difference 
between the two concepts is to ask: who determines the 'merit' or 
'demerit' of a good? If it is the majority of the citizens and their 
representatives, then we are dealing with merit goods, properly so 
called. If it is the political leadership of the country, and their 
opinion conflicts with that of the majority of their subjects, then we 
are dealing with "leaders' preferences". 
In a democraey the existence of merit and demerit goods, properly so 
called, does not abrogate the economie sovereignty of the individual. 
A 1 (iv); Monopoly 
A number of authors say that consumer sovereignty only exists ón 
perfectly competitive markets, where prices equal marginal cost and 
the marginal revenue product of the factors of production is the same 
in all uses25). 
Monopolists restrict output, so that. prices exceed marginal cost and 
economie profits are earned, even in the long run. 
Critique; Opponents use this particular definition of consumer 
sovereignty to prove that it does not exist. Perfect competition does 
not exist and real business life is eharacterised by oligopoly and 
monopolistic elements. There is no consumer sovereignty in 
contemporary imperfectly competitive market economies. 
Defense; M. Rothbard argues that consumer sovereignty does not 
require perfect competition and that monopolistic pricing practices do 
not abrogate it. Monopoly pricing is only profitable when the demand 
Schedule is inelastic (n < -1). This inelastieity of demand is the 
result of the purely voluntary choices of the consumers in their 
maximisation of satisfaction. Monopolists can only maximise their 
monetary incomes by serving the consumers, since all sales are 
voluntary on the part of both the consumers and the producers26). 
Consumer sovereignty only requires the free and voluntary interaction 
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of consumer and producer wants, and that the producers should be 
responsive to consumer preferences (which they need -not be, for 
instance, under 'consumers' freedom of choice'). It does not mean that 
bargaining power and the 'gains from trade' should be distributed 
equally over both sides of the market, or that economie profits should 
be zero in the long run. A profit-maximising monopolist must be as 
responsive to consumer demand as a competitive firm, as simple monopo-
ly models show. Consumer demand, as expressed in the demand and margi-
nal revenue functions, co-determines the profit-maximising output and 
hence the equilibrium monopoly price. Changes in consumer demand 
affect monopoly outputs and prices just like they do on competitive 
markets. Consumer sovereignty is not concerned with the distribution 
of economie power, as it is a principle of resource allocation given 
the distribution of market power (as of income, as we shall see under 
criticism A 1 viii). If the critics object to monopolies, they may try 
to abolish them" and reinstate competitive firms. The principle of 
consumer sovereignty is applicable to both situations. Given the 
existence and degree of monopoly, the consumer is as 'sovereign' over 
the market behaviour of the monopolist as he is over that of the 
competitive firm. 
A 1 (v); 'Producer sovereignty' - the manipulation of consumer 
preferences 
Critique: This is the most common and popular criticism of consumer 
sovereignty. It says that powerful modern advertising and sales 
promotion techniques enable the big producers to manipulate consumer 
preferences to their own advantage. They change the intrinsic prefer-
ences of the consumers and instill new wants in order to maximise 
their profits. The result is that '... the consumers no longer act of 
their own free will. ... The consumer is 'brain-washed' ... Consumer 
wants are no longer a matter of individual choice. They are mass-
produced'27). The overt preferences of the consumers in their market 
behaviour are not their 'real' or 'true' preferences, but false ones 
that the producers want them to have. What they ostensibly want is not 
what they 'really' want, but what the producers want them to. Worse 
still, these are not the necessary goods they 'really' want, but 
socially-undesirable rubbish, which is bought at the expense of the 
really-necessary goods they then no longer want or can afford. The 
critique is twofold: not only are the consumers' preferences not 
genuine, but they are also false in a wrong and wasteful way. Instead 
of consumer sovereignty we have what Galbraith called 'producer 
sovereignty'. Characteristic of this theory is: 
- the view of the producers as big, unscrupulous capitalist 
firms, not as small enterprises or factor owners in general, 
- the view of the consumers as dumb and gullible, 
- the belief that modern sales promotion techniques always yield 
net profits, i.e. that they oost less than the additional 
profits earned. 
To illustrate their argument the critics refer to certain goods which 
they maintain only exist because the producers and their hired 'hidden 
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persuaders' have made the consumers believe that they want them, such 
as electric toothbrushes. The remedies proposed range from more state 
measures for consumer protection and the restriction of commercial 
advertising, to the abolition of consumer sovereignty itself. 
Defense: there are several counter-arguments to this critique, which 
all lead to the conclusion that the producers can only persuade the 
consumers insofar as they willingly let themselves be persuaded -
which means that they are ultimately not 'manipulated' at all. 
(i) The theory of 'producer sovereignty' is simplistic psychology. 
It assumes that consumer behaviour is a conditioned reflex to 
external stimuli, as in the case of Pavlov's dogs. It suggest 
that advertising stimuli are invariably foliowed by the condi-
tioned reflex action of buying the article in question. Of 
course, the proponents of the theory do not say that this 
invariably happens, but then they raust explain why it sometimes 
happens in some cases, but not at all in others. It cannot ex-
plain the exceptions to its predictions, except by tacitly con-
ceding that consumers cannot be manipulated against their will. 
Successful advertising is only possible when it conforms to 
consumer sovereignty. 'Advertisers propose .... but the consumer 
disposes'29). 
(ii) The theory in effect revives J.B. Say's 'law of markets' in a 
qualitative sense. If sales promotion enables the producers to 
sell whatever they want to produce on the basis of their own 
preferences, then 'supply creates its own demand'29)c They can 
then produce whatever they want, without using market research 
or their entrepreneurial skills, and rely on an a priori 
successful manipulation of consumer demand to sell the output at 
profitable prices. Not a single observation of business life 
will support this contention, yet it follows logically from the 
theory of producer sovereignty. It is incapable of explaining 
losses, business failures and notorious advertising flops. Mot a 
single businessman or advertising agent would support it. 
(iii) The theory is also falsified by other observations of business 
life. In the long run, with capital and other resources mobile, 
businessmen can produce anything they want. As profit maximisers 
they should have no own preferences as to what they produce, as 
long as it yields maximum profits. So why do they produce and 
promote only certain products? Producers do not just produce 
anything they feel like and rely on sales promotion to sell the 
output. On the contrary, they use expensive market research to 
find out what the consumers want (or can be profitably made to 
want). Only the production and promotion of selected products 
yields maximum profits, not that of arbitrary goods. The con-
sumer can only be manipulated to buy those goods he fundamental-
ly seems to want anyway. 
Furthermore, modern sales promotion is very expensive and will 
15 
only be undertaken if the additional profits exceed the costs. 
There is no guarantee that sales-increasing advertising will 
also increase net profits! Finally, expenditure on sales promo-
tion is subject to the law of diminishing returns. There is an 
economie limit to the extent that it is able to influence con-
sumer preferences. All these considerations have taught produc-
ers to eoncentrate their promotional efforts on particular 
products only. They only try to persuade the consumer with res^ -
pect to those goods that their market research has shown him 
willing to be persuaded. The advertising profession owes its 
living to this fact. The fallaciousness of the producer sover-
eignty theory is shown by a criticism of T. Scitovsky, who 
accuses the producers of risk aversion and fear of innovative 
activities precisely because of the high penalties they must pay 
when they make wrong guesses about consumers' tastes and put 
unpopular products on the market!30), (Jltimate sovereignty, 
including that over the promotional activities of the producers, 
lies with the consumers. 
(iv) The critics always imply that the preferences of other people 
are manipulated and therefore 'false'. Their own consumption 
pattern apparently always reflects their true preferences. Their 
arguments have an elitist ring. The author still has to meet the 
first believer in producer sovereignty who tries to prove his 
case by quoting his own consumption as an example! 
(v) Another interesting aspect of the argument is that its propo-
nents always use rather harmless examples to prove their case. 
'Harmless', that is, to the feelings of their audiences. As 
examples they will use goods the majority of their audiences do 
not buy or possess anyway, so that they do not hurt their feel-
ings and undermine belief in their argument. When adressing a 
young audience, they will not refer to 'pop' müsic or 'trendy' 
clothing, which one would expect are ideal examples of producer 
manipulation! Similarly (the cri.tics usually holding leftwing 
views) they will not refer to the mass-produced goods primarily 
bought by the lower income groups. The reason for this reticence 
is obvious: no-one really believes that his own personal 
consumption is the result of insidious producer manipulation. On 
the contrary: everbody believes that his own tastes reflect his 
'true' preferences! If you want to convince people that the 
consumer is manipulated by the producers, don't quote their own 
consumption to them as proof! 
(vi) Linked to the previous two points is the moralising attitude of 
the critics. They imply that the goods of which they approve 
satisfy people's 'true' wants and, if they sell well, do so on 
account of their intrinsic merit. Goods of which they disapprove 
reflect manipulated preferences and only sell well because the 
producers have brainwashed the consumers into buying them. An 
explanation for this attitude may be sought in the supposition 
that the adherents of producer sovereignty cannot accept that 
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millions of apparently-normal people voluntarily buy huge quan-
tities of what they consider to be 'rubbish'. The critics are 
intellectuals with leftwing inclinations, who believe in the 
innate goodness of Man and find this faith difficult to recon-
cile with the daily evidence of his reprehensible consumption 
patterns. One way out of this raoral dilemma is to proclaim that 
these people do not really buy 'junk' out of their own volition, 
but because they have been manipulated by the producers. In this 
way faith in man and evidence of his bad taste can be 
reconciled. 
(vii) The argument is not extended to the democratie political pro-
cess, where it would also apply. Politicians can be seen as 
entrepreneurss and their parties as enterprises, selling pros-
pective government services. Their elections campaigns are 
similar to the advertising campaigns of business firms. Yet 
believers in producer sovereignty hesitate to extend their 
critique of individualist ethics to the political 'market'. This 
fact was noted by Von Mises and Rothbard, who called it a 'fatal 
contradiction': individuals who are not deemed competent to 
choose their own consumption patterns are thought capable of 
choosing the right political leaders for an entire country!31) 
The cause of this lies of course in the consequences of applying 
the producer sovereignty argument to the political sphere: it 
then becomes a denial of the democratie political system as 
existent in the West. Most of the critics favour representative 
democracy and rèfusê to take this logical step (although 
Marxists do not hesitate to do so). 
(viii)A final argument against this theory is its theoretical sterili-
ty. It is only employed in a critical sense, to show that 
consumer sovereignty does not exist. However, a positive theory 
of producer sovereignty to replace it is not offered., There is 
no theory of how producer preferences and sovereignty function 
as basis for real-life market allocation. If consumer sovereign-
ty did not exist, one would expect the people who have been say-
ing so for over half a century to have developed a theory of how 
the market economy works without it. This has not been the case. 
Summing up, the popular argument that there is no consumer sovereignty 
because the consumers are manipulated by the producers, can be 
countered by several arguments to the contrary. The very fact that 
there is no theory to explain how market allocation functions under 
producer sovereignty proves the argument to be untrue. 
Al (vi); The social determination of individual preferences 
Critique: Another common argument says that individuals do not 
really have autonomous preferences. Man is a social being and lives by 
conforming to a society of fellow-humans. Once a certain degfee of 
satisfaction of his biological needs has been reached, his further 
wants become social, conditioned by the society around him. It is even 
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probable that in affluent Western societies the greater part of a 
person's wants are social and psychological in nature, shaped by the 
customs and conventions of society32), The 'Duesenberry-effect' is a 
case in point: people copy the life-style and consumption pattern of 
the socio-economic group towards which they aspire. 'Consumer' 
societies such as ours have 'trend-setting' groups whose innovative 
consumption patterns are, with time lags, successively imitated by 
increasinglysslarger sections of the population. From this the critics 
conclude that there is no such thing as autonomous individual prefer-
ences and hence no consumer sovereignty. 
Defense: Proponents of consumer sovereignty admit that society is a 
major determinant of the individual's preferences, which are therefore 
socially-conditioned. They do point out some unsatisfactory aspects of 
the argument that therefore intrinsic individual preferences do not 
exist. If certain people 'keep up with the Joneses', who do the 
Joneses keep up with? Who do the trend-setters follow? The argument 
has a loose end - there must be some individuals whose preferences are 
not derived from other people. Otherwise the argument would be 
circular - everybody's preferences are determined by everybody else's. 
Such an explanation is clearly unsatisfactory. 
More important, it does not matter where- or how the individuals' 
preferences originate, whether out of their intrinsic needs or out of 
their social interaction with other people. The point is that the 
individuals experience them as their own. The purpose of consumer 
sovereignty is to maximise individual welfare as they experience it 
themselves, regardless of its well-springs. It is in any case impossi-
ble to distinguish between the intrinsic and the socially-conditioned 
part of an individual's preferences. There is no clear-cut boundary 
between the two. The individual himself will not be able to 
distinguish between them and any outsider's opinion is arbitrary and 
presumptuous. 
Dobb says that if one changes the society in which people live, their 
preferences will change as well. Therefore there is no need to take 
their original preferences as the touchstone for a rational alloea-
tion33). He apparently suggests that one should first change capita-
list society into a socialist one and then take the individuals' now-
altered preferences as guidelines for the allocation process. What he 
objects to is then not the socially-conditioned nature of individual 
preferences, but their actual-content under capitalism. His critique 
is not aimed at consumer sovereignty, but at the capitalist system. 
Defendants of consumer sovereignty say that it exists (and should do 
so) even if the major part of the individual's preferences are social-
ly-determined. Individual preferences are subjective and it does not 
matter where or how they originate, or by whom and what they are 
influenced, as long as individuals experience them as their own and 
act on them. 
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A 1 (vii): Ex post transmission of consumer preferences to the 
producers 
Critique: In modern economies the consumers cannot and do not teil 
the producers beforehand what they must produce. Modern mass-produc-
tion technology forces the producers first to make the goods they 
expect the consumers to want. Production precedes consumption. This 
argument is usually foliowed by that of producer sovereignty: the 
producers first make the goods and then proceed to sell them with the 
aid of sales promotion. The critics say that consumer sovereignty in 
an ex ante sense may have existed in pre-industrial society, where 
craftsmen produced to order and probably knew their customers by name, 
but that it is an anachronism in modern industrial societyS^). 
Defense; Adherents of consumer sovereignty deny that modern 
consumers have no ex ante control over the producers. In the case of 
existant goods it is most recent consumer demand, as reflected in the 
sales and profit figures, which teil the producers whether to continue 
or to stop production. With new products the producers must make the 
best estimate of what they expect the consumers to want. The consumers 
exercise an ex post judgement when the goods appear on the market. If 
they do not conform to their preferences, they will not buy them at 
prices which yield the producers sufficiënt profits. Again profit or 
loss figures teil the producer whether to stop or to carry on produc-
tion. In this way the consumer has the decisive ex post veto35). 
Nothing that is not desired by the consumers will be produced for 
long. If consumer sovereignty did not exist because production prece-
des consumption, there would be no need of expensive market researchs 
nor would there be an explanation for the very high rate of failures 
amongst the new products annually brought into the mark 
et36). 
A 1 (viii): Unequal voting 
Critique: This is another common argument of socialist critics. 
Early proponents of consumer sovereignty likened market allocation to 
the democratie voting process, with each buyer tendering money as his 
'vote' for a particular product. The market was seen as an impersonal 
and democratie institution like the ballot box. The critics do not 
deny that the 'dollar vote' is impersonal and that the majority of the 
'votes' also carry the issue here, but point out that the number of 
votes is very unevenly distributed over the population. Whereas in a 
democracy each individual has only one vote, in the market process 
property and incomes are unevenly distributed and some 'voters' 
possess many more votes than others. Their vote weighs more than that 
of people with a lower income, so that their wants are satisfied at 
the expense of those of others. With unequal incomes the market voting 
process is the dictatorship of" a small minority of the rich over a 
large majority of the poor. The critics say that if consumer sover-
eignty is presented as a democratie allocation principle, where every 
consumer has a say in the allocation, then it does not exist in real-
world economies. Poor 'voters' whose 'vote' is frustrated through 
their lack of purchasing power have no say in the process and are 
therefore not 'sovereign'. Consumer sovereignty does not exist under 
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an unequal distribution of wealth and incorae. 
Defense: The point of this criticism is misplaced. The concept does 
not say that all consumers are equally sovereign and have an equal 
voice in the allocation process. Some individuals may well have more 
say than others. The essence of the principle is that individual 
preferences determine the allocation. It is compatible with both an 
equal and an unequal distribution of purchasing power. If the critics 
object to the unequal distribution existing in real-life market 
economies, then . they must try to change it. The principle is as 
applicable to an egalitarian society as to an inegalitarian one, as it 
is a principle of income-spending, not of income-acquisition or -
distribution37). it is not even true, theoretically speaking, that 
consumers with insufficiënt purchasing power have no effect on, and 
therefore no say in, the allocation of scarce resources. Even demand 
below the final equilibrium price has an effect on the price and quan-
tity of a good by playing a role in the determination of that price. 
Under voter sovereignty the political authorities may take 
redistributive measures without affecting the economie sovereignty of 
the individual. Consumer sovereignty is compatible with governmental 
measures (such as progressive taxation) that seek to redress 
distributions of wealth or income the individuals find unsatisfactory. 
A 2; Critique of factor owner sovereignty as a positive concept 
There is hardly any criticism of the concept of factor owner 
sovereignty in a general sense. On the contrary, criticism A 1 (v) of 
consumer sovereignty says that certain factor owners, i.e. the 
producers, are the true sovereigns in a market economy. 
A 2 (i): No worker sovereignty 
Critique: One point of criticism says that some factor owners are 
not sovereign. Socialists refer to the alleged powerlessness of the 
workers to freely select their occupation, place of work, wage Ievel, 
etc. Workers are not sovereign over the allocation of their labour 
power, as the owners of the other factors of production are assumed to 
be. They are at the disposal of their employers and have to accept 
their decisions as to employment, place of work and wages. There is no 
sovereignty of the worker38), 
Defense; It is very difficult to argue this point with convinced 
Marxists. It is partly a matter of 'Weltanschauung' whether one wants 
to see modern employees as free economie agents seeking the best 
allocation of their labour power, or as wage-slaves subject to the 
will of their employers. One of the problems lies in the definition of 
'worker* - only a diminishing part of the modern employees are still 
•workers' in the classic socialist sense. The existence of a highly-' 
dif ferentiated wage structure also mitigates agairtst this argument'. 
Wages are differentiated to take account of the job preferences of 
workers. If they were indeed powerless over the allocation of their 
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labour power, there would be no need for differentiated wages. 
A 3; Critique of voter sovereignty as a positive concept 
There is also little explicit criticism of vote sovereignty. To do so, 
the critics must either demonstrate that 'democracy' does not exist in 
real-life representative democracies, or that even in a democracy the 
allocation by the government does not conform to the preferences of 
the simple majority of the citizens. In this context it must be stres-
sed that voter sovereignty only exists in a political democracy. In a 
dictatorship there is no voter sovereignty and hence no economie so-
vereignty of the individual. If there is a market economy in a right-
wing dictatorship, there may be consumer and faijtor owner sovereignty, 
but the government's allocation of resources will not reflect the 
majority of the voters' preferences. It is inadmissable to use the 
examples of dictatorships with a market economy (e.g. Franco Spain or 
fascist Italy) as arguments against 'consumer' sovereignty in the 
wider sense. 
A 3 (i)= Capitalist democracy is not true democracy 
Critique: Marxist critics aver that Western representative democracy 
is not 'true' democracy as they defineit. This means that there is no 
voter sovereignty under such a system. They employ an 'essentialist' 
definition of democracy, which enumerates a number of ideal character-
istics of a 'truly' democratie society, such as an egalitarian 
dlstribution of economie power and incomes, state guarantees of 
employment and minimum living standards8 etc Such characteristics 
are not commonly found in Western representative democracies, with 
their unequal distributions of income and the privately-owned means of 
production. Marxists say that in such a society the state is but the 
executive organ of the capitalist class (this is the so-called 
'Agenturtheorie des Staates'). lts decisions conform only to the 
preferences of a small minority of the rich and powerful, and not to 
the wants of the poor. This kind of state intervention is therefore 
'underaooratie'. 
Defense: This argument hinges on the definition of 'democracy'. In 
the non-marxist definition democracy is both a process for 
ascertaining and aggregating the wishes of the majority of the voters 
and a state that exists when government activities conform to these 
preferences. If one accepts this traditional definition then voter 
sovereignty does exist in a representative democracy, irrespective of 
the distribution of wealth and incomes. 
A 3 (ii): 'Package' supply in political decision-making 
Critique; A major difference between market and political allocation 
is the fact that in the market the individual can choose specific 
goods and buy only these, whereas in the political voting process he 
must vote for a party offering an entire bundie or 'package' of goods 
and services. There will not be a party offering exactly the bundie 
each individual wants. People must then vote for the party whose 
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proffered bundie comes closest to their specific set of preferences, 
and also accept the goods they do not want. Thus it may happen that 
even in a democracy certain goods are produced which are not wanted by 
a majority of the voters39). Furthermore, party programmes do not 
only comprise economie issues, but also political, religious and other 
non-economic ones. It can and does happen that a party will win an 
election on the basis of such non-economic issues, whereas its 
economie programme is not desired by a majority of the voters. This is 
another reason why economie decisions in a democracy may not reflect 
the wishes of a majority of the citizens. Market choice is more 
personalised and consumers seldom have to accept other goods they do 
not want when buying something they do want. Such 'package' deals are 
even forbidden in some countries. 
Defense: This is no criticism of voter sovereignty in actual demo-
cracies, but of the efficaey of representative democracy in satisfying 
individual wants. Even at its best this system cannot ensure that 
every economie deeision made by the representatives conforms to the 
wishes of the majority of the voters. However, there are a number of 
built-ün mechanisms which prevent government decisions from deviating 
too far from the wishes of the electorate, such as parliamentary 
debates and periodic elections. Furthermore, for colleetive and merit 
goods there is no better alternative for representative democracy. 
•Direct democracy' and referenda are hardly possible in populous 
modern societies; and certainly not for the innumerable colleetive 
decisions which must be made daily. This criticism is in fact a plea 
for the market mechanism and for consumer, as opposed to voter, 
sovereignty. 
A 3 (iii): Distortions of voter preferences 
Critique: Even democratie decision-making does not automatieally 
lead to a corresponding allocation. Two kinds of distortion are 
possible. The first occurs when voter preferences must be transformed 
into political decisions. Politicians are not the selfless agents of 
the voters they represent, but have aims and preferences of their own. 
When they must take decisions on the basis of their electoral program-
mes they to some extent smuggle in their own preferences. This 
'colours' the decisions, which then do not entirely correspond to the 
wishes of the voters. The other type of distortion occurs during the 
execution of these decisions by a hierarchy of government officials. 
They also have their own goals, which they insert into their execution 
of the orders given them by their political superiors. This may make 
the final allocation correspond even less to the orginal wishes of the 
majority of the voters. Both kinds of distortion vitiate voter 
sovereignty. 
Defense; Again, this is a criticism of representative democracy as 
an instrument for implementing the economie sovereignty of the indivi-
dual. The existence of opposition parties and periodic elections pro-
vide some guarantee that politicians and their subordinate officials 
cannot distort voters' preferences too much. Some distortions will 
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persist, but large deviations from the mandate of the voters will 
create opportunities for electoral gain for the opposition^O). As in 
any other principal - agent relationship, the margin of tolerance will 
be determined by the costs of monitoring and policing the agents, i.e. 
the governing party. The self-interest of the opposition parties helps 
to keep these costs low for the citizens. 
The same arguments apply to other problems of representative democracy 
as a means of determining and exeeuting the will of the majority of 
the population, such as Arrow's 'general imposslbility' theorem. 
Representative democracy is not a perfect instrument for realising 
voter sovereignty, but no better alternative for making the necessary 
collective decisions exists. Again, these failures of the political 
decision-making system show that where applicable, consumer 
sovereignty and the market mechanism are better instruments for 
impleraenting the economie sovereignty of the individual. 
B: The economie sovereignty of the individual as a normative concept 
The normative concept says that the allocation of all goods and ser-
vices should correspond to the preferences of the individual members 
of a society. This is a value judgement, depending on the moral views 
held by a person. Criticism of the normative concept also depends on 
the ethical or political views of the critic. There is less criticism 
of the normative concept than of the positive one. More people in Wes-
tern societies are willing to say that it ought to exist, than that it 
in fact does exist. The reason is that the underlying ethical princi-
ple is generally accepted in Western society. The alternative, the 
sovereignty of someone else Over the economie life of a person is 
repugnant to most people. 
B 1 (i): Critique and defense of consumer sovereignty as a normative 
concept 
The normative critique of consumer sovereignty is adressed to all 
three of its aspects: its consumption orientation, its individualism 
and its subjectivism. 
B 1 (i): 'Consumptionism' 
Critique: The crities charge that consumer sovereignty is the cause 
of Western 'consumer society', in which the apparent suprème goal of 
lifê is the acquisition and eonsumption of goods and services. So-
called 'conspicuous consumption' has supplanted all other human values 
and dominates Western soeial life. A host of social evils plaguing our 
society and the rest of the world is ascribed to this ideology of 
'consumptionism', such as alienation, materialism, superficiality, the 
despoilation of nature and the exploitation of the underdeveloped 
countries. This critique has a very long history, going back to the 
early I9th century. It was resuscitated by such neo-marxist 
intellectuals as Herbert Marcuse in the 1960's and it played a major 
role in the student revolts against the 'consumer society'. The 
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critique of 'consumer society' is at the same time a critique of 
consumer sovereignty in the normative sense. The critics say that 
consumption ought not be the highest goal in society. They aceuse 
consumer sovereignty of fostering a 'consumptionist' mentality. 
Defense: Consumer sovereignty operates only within the economie 
sphere of life. It is not concerned with religious, social or 
political values outside the field of economics. If the critics are 
right in saying that economie values have come to dominate all others 
in Western society, then this is both a tribute to the efficiency with 
which the market system pursues its goal (which can only be the 
economie one of maximising the production of goods and services - an 
economie system cannot pursue any other than eco^mic goals); and a 
critique of the values apparently held by most people in Western 
society. The blame for the 'consumptionist' spirit lies not with the 
market mechanism and the principle of consumer sovereigtny, but with 
the values held by people in secular societies with an advanced 
technology. Each facet of human existenee pursues its own specific 
goals: social life its social goals, political life its political 
goals. If people in Western society ehose to give the highest priority 
to the economie aspect of their life and to devote most of their time 
to their economie goals, that is their own free choice. 
Secondly, within the economie sphere of life, consumer sovereignty 
merely stresses the priority of consumption over production. It says 
that production ought to be adapted to voluntary consumptive demand. 
It does not exist for its own sake, or for that of economie growth,, 
but in order to satisfy the wants of the consumers aeeording to their 
own preferenees^l). 
B 1 (ii): Against individualism 
Critique: Many critics object to the stress laid on the individual 
consumer, factor owner and voter in the principle of individual 
economie sovereignty. They believe that the individual should not be 
viewed as the crux of societal organisation and its economie system. 
Man is a soeial being and the essence of mankind is its social 
existenee. The social entities in which man lives are more than the 
sum of their individual members. Implicitly such critics ascribe to an 
'organic' theory of social entities. The state is seen as more than 
the sum of its individual citizens, and the same holds for other 
collective bodies like 'the people' or 'the proletariat'. They say 
that it is this greater social whole which should be the subject of 
any social theory. The allocation process should serve the interests 
of the nation, the people or the race, which count for more than the 
individuals they are composed of. Individualism promotes egoism and 
leads to disregard for the greater social whole. 
Defense: This criticism touches the essence of consumer sovereignty. 
The principle says that the welfare of the individual should be the 
aim and object of economie life. The essence of consumer sovereignty 
is normative individualism: 'nihil est praeter individuum' (Abelard). 
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lts proponents say that no collective entity has a real, concrete 
existence of its own. They are not living organisms and cannot 
experience wants. They have no preferences of their own, apart from 
those of their individual members. All collective entities are the 
sums of their parts, if we include the interrelationships between the 
parts^). 
No economist has yet constructed an operative theory on the basis of 
'methodological collectivism', which would be the antithesis of the 
individualist concept. On the contrary, over the past decades all 
theories treating collective entities like the firm, the state, the 
central planners etc. as if they were a single decision-maker (the so-
called 'black box' assumption) have come in for heavy methodological 
criticism. Students of public choice theory now know that 'the state' 
does not make decisions and provides collective goods, but that 
individual politicians and officials do. Holistic concepts like 'the 
state' or 'society' are no longer used as analytical tools in modern 
economie and political science. All collectivists, who want to replace 
the individual by some collective entity, must explain exactly how and 
by what means this entity will express itself and what the relation-
ship between 'its* aims and those of its individual members will be. 
If they are democrats, they must fall back on some democratie system 
for aggregating individual preferences. If they are not, then the so-
called preferences of the collective body are in fact those of its 
rulers or of the authors themselves. 
In most instances the theory of the organic existence of social 
collectives has served to camouflage the partieular preferences of 
those individuals who profess to speak in the name of such bodies. 'He 
who says 'the people', wishes to deceive'. Proudhon has said. Rulers 
of all sorts have always invoked the 'pluralis maiestatis' to give 
greater credence to their own personal convictions and demands. Norma-
tive collectivism must lead to étatism and the dictatorial imposition 
of the preferences of those who profess to speak on behalf of the 
collective. Any critique of individualism as the basis for economie 
choice must eifher rest on a misunderstanding of the nature of 
'collective' wants, or on the advocacy of certain partieular interests 
camouflaged as those of some collective entity. 
Proponents of the economie sovereignty of the individual stress that 
collective decisions must be taken by means of the democratie 
aggregation of individual preferences. 'Collective' decisions based on 
any other principle are dictatorial. 
B 1 (iii): Against subjectivism 
Critique: The fundamental principle underlying the economie sover-
eignty of the individual is that all individuals should decide for 
themselves, on the basis of their own subjective preferences, as to 
what serves their interests best. '... everyone should have the right 
to be free to pursue his own interest as he deerns best ,a+3). Against 
this value judgement the critics advance a number of arguments to 
25 
prove that the individual is not always the best judge of his own 
interests. 
a) Imperfect knowledge. Some critics say that consumers, especially 
in complex modern societies, act on the basis of very imperfect 
knowledge. Modern markets are not transparent and single individu-
als cannot know all the data required for rational decision-making. 
They say that the government and its experts possess more and 
better information and should have the right to interfere with the 
individuals' decisions, if this would lead to greater welfare for 
them. 
b) Faulty preferences. Dobb has argued that many of the consumers' 
preferences are stupid and wasteful. They lead to the production 
of unneccessary products that do not contribute to true welfare. 
Furthermore, consumers are fickle, causing continuous changes in 
the production process and excessive product differentiation. This 
makes mass-production and long production runs with their economies 
of scale impossible. Less goods are produces at higher cost, with 
national welfare less than it could have been^). 
Scitovsky criticised consumer sovereignty for precisely the 
opposite reason: it leads to the domination of 'low-brow' tastes 
and the elimination of superior varieties of goods. This is an 
élitist counterpole to Dobb's argument*^). 
c) Economie myopia. A special case of faulty preferences is made for 
the time preferences of the individuals. Dobb has stressed that 
consumer preferences are especially defective and a bad guide to 
decision-making when it comes to allocating resources over time. 
They are Short r-sighted and underestimate the future. It was 
A.C. Pigou who 'first mentioned the 'telescopic faculty* of the 
consumers as savers. All socialists have used this argument to 
prove that the consumers' time preferences should not be allowed to 
determine the national rate of saving (and hence of investment and 
growth)^6). They are convinced these crucial rates will be too 
low if left to the aggregated time preferences of the individuals. 
They also apply this criticism to a future socialist society. Even 
a liberal socialist like Oskar Lange would have the rate of saving 
and investment in his model of 'market socialism' arbitrarily and 
authoritatively determined by the political authorities, and not by 
the aggregated time preferences of the citizens1*?). 
Defense; The following counter-arguments can be raised against these 
points of criticism: 
a) Against 'imperfect knowledge'; No-one would deny that individu-
als make their decisions on the basis of imperfect knowledge. Had 
they been better informed, they might have made different deci-
sions. On the other hand, human opinions about the quality of 
information differ. What one person may think more or better infor-
mation may not be thought so by someone else. It can only be esta-
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blished ex post which of the two was correct, and then only by the 
agent himself. This criticism is in fact a plea for more informa-
tion for the consumers, which is not the same thing as abolishing 
their right to decide freely for themselves on the basis of their 
own knowledge and judgement. Anyone who thinks that he is better 
informed is free to offer his advice. But the individual must have 
the right to accept or reject this advice - even if his own 
information is patently 'wrong' in the opinion of all other 
parties^S). 
b) Against 'faulty preferences1: This is a purely subjective 
critique. There is no objective Standard of 'right' and 'wrong' 
preferences. The Latin proverb 'De gustibus non disputandum est' 
exists in all European languages and is the only method of avoiding 
conflict over subjective value judgements. Neither can a clear 
distinction be made between the 'real needs' of people, as opposed 
to their 'mere wants'. What one person may call a 'real need', 
another may call an unnecessary 'want'. 
Social conflict and ultimate dictatorship can only be avoided by 
granting all preferences equal legitimacy. Tolerance is not a 
virtue, but a survival strategy based upon egoistic premisses. 
The only legitimate instance of suppressing some consumer preferen-
ces is democratie legislation under voter sovereignty (see point 
A 1 ii). Such legislation also rests on subjective judgements, even 
if supported by a majority of the voters, and there is no guarantee 
that a majority judgement is objectively 'right'. One merely has to 
think of majority opinions concerning 'right' and 'wrong' prefer-
ences during the Third Reich in Germany. 
The contradictory arguments of Dobb and Scitovsky already illus-
trate the potential conflicts inherent in the notion of 'wrong' 
preferences. Dobb would reduce product differentiation and 
standardise goods for mass consumption, whereas Scitovsky would 
increase 'the differentiation to allow for élite tastes. The final 
decision as to which would be a struggle between two different 
conceptions of 'good' preferences. History gives reason to fear 
that the decisive factor would be the 'ultima ratio',force. 'Might 
is right' would be the result. 
Finally, the argument of 'wrong' preferences is paternalistic. By 
saying that certain preferences are 'wrong', the critic is saying 
that he has the discrimination to see this, that he can judge which 
preferences should be suppressed. In effect he is demanding the 
dictatorship of his own subjective opinions over those of others. 
In a controversy over consumer sovereignty a' 'radical' critic once 
remarked that we must 'play God'. The question is: who is to be 
'God'? Everybody will want to, once they are aware that what'is at 
stake is their personal freedom to pursue their own preferences 
and the result will be a bitter social struggle. 
The argument of 'good' and 'bad' preferences is a very dangerous 
one to use for all who love their own freedom. But it is also 
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dangerous for those who do not care for other people's liberty and 
would like to irapose their own 'good' preferences upon thera. They 
cannot be sure that they would win the ensuing struggle and raay 
find others iraposing their preferences upon them - which are the 
very ones they wanted to suppress in the first place! 
c) Against 'economie myopia': This is merely a special instancë of 
the previous case. If we abolish the individual determination of 
the rate of saving, how will 'the state' find out the 'correct' 
rate? One possibility is to let parliament annually set the proper 
rate and amount for the coming year, with majority rule deciding 
the issue. But if this decision is taken under voter sovereignty, 
then again the myopie time preferences of the individual voters are 
ultimately decisive. The socialist critics do not have such a 
democratie determination of the national saving rate in mind. 
Dobb criticises the rationality of individual decision-making in 
general. It is not only the market determination of the rate that 
he objects to, but to the individualist basis of the saving deci-
sion as such. He has no greater confidence in the individual as a 
voter than as a consumer^9). What such socialists propose is that 
the political leaders of the state should set the rate according to 
their own preferences. Given the marxist teleology of reaching the 
promised 'realm of freedom' of communism as soon as possible, they 
will set this rate higher than would be the case under a democratie 
aggregation of the individuals' time preferences. This leads to a 
régime of 'forced saving' by means of dictatorially-imposed taxes. 
This is the logical solution to the problem of the individuals' 
economie myopia. Nowadays this rationalisation of a forced saving 
policy is heard less frequently, presumably due to concern over 
environmental deterioration and resource depletion. Here too, a 
similar case can be made for suppressing individual preferences by 
means of authoritarian measures to conserve nature. 
Some of the points of criticism of consumer sovereignty as a normative 
concept also apply to it when used in a positive sense and have been 
discussed in sectiorf A 1. 
B 2: Critique of factor owner sovereignty as a normative concept 
We must distinguish between the ownership of the human production 
factor 'labour power' and that of the inanimate factors of production 
such as land and capital. There is a common concensus that the 
'owners' of labour power (i.e. the 'workers' in the broad sense of the 
word) ought to be free to dispose over their 'property' as they think 
fit. Everybody is in favour of worker sovereignty. Not even a centra-
list socialist like Dobb would have it supplanted by labour conscrip-
tion. Apart from ethical considerations, historical experience shows 
that 'forced' labour (i.e. labour allocated irrespective of the job 
preferences of the workers themselves) has a low productivity and high 
monitoring costs. Contrary to popular opinion, 'forced' labour is not 
.cheap. Societies that in modern times have resorted to labour 
conscription have usually done so under exceptional cireumstances and 
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rescinded such measures once the emergency situation was over. 
Libertarian authors say that this argument of economie efficiency also 
applies to individual sovereignty over the inanimate factors of 
production. This is an argument in favour of private ownership of the 
means of production. There is some theoretical support for this view 
in the theory of property rightsSO). However, there is no concensus 
on this point: all socialists are against private ownership of the 
means of production and therefore against the sovereignty of 
particular individuals over them. Indeed, all of marxist economics 
can be seen as a critique of' the sovereignty of particular individu-
als over the inanimate factors of production! 
B 3: Critique of voter sovereignty as a normative concept 
There is no explicit eriticism of the normative concept of voter 
sovereignty in economie literature. This is not surprising, for the 
critic would in fact be against democratie political decision-making 
and no-one is willing to say that openly. Yet this is what a particu-
lar critique of the economie sovereignty of the individual comes down 
to. It is one thing to reject the literal concept of 'consumer' sover-
eignty and to plead for democratie political decision- making (i.e. 
voter sovereignty) in its place. But when one rejects decision-making 
on the basis of individual preferences i_n general, then one also 
rejects the normative precept of voter sovereignty. This is what 
M. Dobb seems to do in several of his works51). By arguing that 
individual preferences are irrational and unsuitable to° serve as the 
sole basis for social decision-makings he is not only rejecting con-
sumer sovereignty, but voter sovereignty as well. Both ultimately rest 
on the preferences of individual human beings, and that is precisely 
what Dobb objects to, without saying so all too explicitly and without 
. suggesting that individual preferences should be suppressed altogeth-
er. It is doubtful whether any of the critics of the rationality of 
individual preferences realise that they are in effect undermining the 
foundations of voter sovereignty and democracy. As Von Mises and 
Rothbard pointed out in their 'fatal contradiction': if the economie 
preferences of the individuals are irrational and unsuitable for 
determining the allocation of the national resources, then their 
political preferences should also not be allowed to determine the 
nation's political life! 
3. Conclusion; the relevance of the debate over consumer sovereignty 
In the preceding pages we saw that the economie sovereignty of the 
individual is* rightly or wrongly, subject to a barrage of eriticism 
in both its positive and normative connotations. The question arlses: 
even if the rebuttals of all the individual points of critique seem 
convincing, is it all worth it? Is it worth maintaining a rather 
abstract concept that gives rise to so many misunderstandings and 
criticisms? Is it worth so elaborate a defense? Is it not a Lakatósian 
'degenerating programme', which yields little theoretical and 
empirical progress and needs to be defended by multiple layers of 
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'protective beits'?52). 
Proponents of the concept argue that its proper value is only compre-
hended when one considers the consequences of its abolition. In con-
clusion we shall therefore examine what the theoretical implications 
and the practical consequences would be, if the critics were to be 
right in their rejection of the concept in both its meanings. 
If the critique of the positive concept is correct and there is indeed 
no consumer sovereignty in Western market economies, then the actual 
allocation process in these economies has no ethical and welfare-theo-
retieal foundation. Modern micro-economie theory should then be dis-
carded, for there would be no foundation for its theories of consumer 
behaviour and the interaction of supply and demand. Without its basis. 
of consumer sovereignty, conventional micro-economie theory hangs in 
the air. It can no longer explain how market allocation works. 
The onus of providing an alternative theory rests upon the critics: 
they must formulate an alternative theory that is both consistent and 
realistic. They cannot reject the positive concept of consumer 
sovereignty and its derived body of micro-economie theory and merely 
leave the term 'producer sovereignty' in its place. They must then 
also explain what the preferences of the producers are, why they are 
that, and show how market allocation functions under producer 
sovereignty. We saw that they have not yet devised such a theory. The 
result is that apparently market allocation has no theoretical 
foundation! These considerations demonstrate the fallaeiousness of the 
critique of consumer sovereignty in its positive sense. 
If the concept should be rejeeted on normative grounds, then we are in 
fact rejecting the ethical basis of free market and democratie politi-
cal allocation. Logic then demands that we should abolish the market 
and democracy as well, together with all other institutional means 
necessary for the efficiënt functioning of these two allocative 
institutions. We must then find an alternative normative principle for 
- resource allocation. The only alternative is "planners"' or 'leaders' 
sovereignty'. Despite Dobb's protestations against the 'unreal anti-
thesis' between consumers' and leaders' sovereignty, there is simply 
no other theory of an alternative principle to guide resource 
allocation. None of the detractors of consumer sovereignty has ever 
formulated a full-fledged, consistent and ethically-aceeptable 
alternative. They do not explain in any detail what should replace it, 
apart from some vague references to democratie collective decision-
making (which show that they have not understood the relationship 
between consumer and voter sovereignties) or to disinterested govern-
ment experts who are to decide for the individuals on account of their 
superior knowledge. 
Any critique of the individuals' preferences, as voluntarily manifes-
ted by themselves, as either being 'wrong' or 'false' must next 
proclaim that somebody or something else does know what their proper 
preferences should be. It follows that this person or body should have 
the right and the power to suppress the individuals' 'wrong' preferen-
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ces and irapose their 'proper' ones on thera. This is the rationale for 
'leaders' sovereignty'. 
The defining eharacteristics of leaders' preferences are: 
i) they differ from those of the majority of the population and 
would be ineffective minority preferences in a democratie 
collective decision-making process; 
ii) they are held by people with sufficiënt coercive power over 
the other citizens in a society to have them effected despite 
this - i.e. by the political leaders of a country; 
iii) they are effectuated by suppressing the preferences of the 
other individuals in their market or electoral manifestations; 
iv) they are therefore dictatorial. 
'Leaders' sovereignty' means the dictatorship of the subjective pre-
ferences of a minority of the population, the political leaders. This 
is not to say that such preferences are 'arbitrary' - on the contrary, 
they are deliberately and willfully determined and often elaborately 
rationalised. Their justification has ranged from the divine right of 
kings and the authoritarian right of dictators ('ii Duce ha sempre ra-
gione'), to economie arguments about the 'true' welfare of the people. 
Nowadays the case for suppressing the population's overt preferences 
is usually clothed in terms of lts 'true' and 'long-term' welfare. The 
ultimate justification of leaders' sovereignty is 'might is right'. 
Leaders' sovereignty exists in many countries. In all socialist 
countries the market has been abolished, but it was not replaced by 
some kind of democratie collective decision-making, as originally 
envisaged by many socialist idealists. Historieal experience indieates 
that when consumer and factor owner sovereignty are abolished, they 
are not succeeded by voter sovereignty, but that voter sovereignty it-
self is also abolished, to be replaced by the will of an authoritarian 
leadership. This appears to be the logical consequence of the 
abolition of the market, and not some unfortunate but explicable 
'accident' of history, as certain believers in the theory of the 
'bureaucratie deformation of soeialism' say. , 
If we want to avoid leaders' sovereignty and the undemocratic politi-
cal order it requires, then we must know what 'consumer sovereignty', 
i.e. the economie sovereignty of the individual, is all about. Funda-
mentally, consumer sovereignty means the economie freedom of the 
individual; and ultimately his political freedom as well. 'Consumer 
sovereignty and the liberal system therefore stand or fall 
together'53). it is this bond with individual liberty that gives the 
concept it lasting appeal, despite all the criticisiii directed against 
it. The crities themselves are aware of this, which is why they 
hesitate to propose its outright abolition. Even such a fervent 
opponent as M. Dobb phrases his criticism very carefully so as to 
avoid saying that it should be abolished altogether54). Even less do 
they say that they want to have it supplanted by leaders' sovereignty. 
In the words of a radical neo-marxist like Paul Baran: 'Neither I nor 
any other marxist writer with whose works I am familiar, has ever 
advoeated the abolition of consumer sovereignty and its replacement by 
the orders of a commissar'. This is true, but the trouble is that they 
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give no details of any third possibility beyond such nebulous and 
contradictory statements as '... by a system of rationally planned 
production for use, by a universe of human relations determined by and 
oriented toward solidarity, cooperation, and freedom'55). Merely to 
criticise consumer sovereignty leads to a theoretical cul-de-sac: on 
the one hand either there is no such thing or, if there is, it is bad 
because the consumer is a bad sovereign; but on the other hand one 
must avoid authoritarianism. Historical experience until now shows 
that it has not been possible to do this. Criticism of the economie 
sovereignty of the individual paves the way for the suppression of his 
preferences and for the imposition of those of authoritarian leaders. 
On the other hand, adherents of the principle must admit that the 
majority of the consumers may well be very bad 'sovereigns* indeed: 
that they may be stupid, gullible, rapacious and shortsighted and have 
abominable tastes. Nevertheless, in a democracy all men are equal and 
should be equally free to pursue their own conceptions of their 
happiness. The price to pay for the freedom to pursue one's own goals 
is to grant others the same right to pursue theirs, no matter how much 
one disapproves of them. 
In the 1962 panel discussion on consumer sovereignty Baumol warned 
against the over-critical analysis of this fundamental ethical concept 
underlying Western society. 'In doing so, we will be right in every 
detail, but" wrong on what matters most'56). we have argued that the 
critics are not even right in the matters of detail, let alone the 
fundamental principle itself. The concept of 'consumer' sovereignty 
may be badly defined and in actual fact a misnomer, but '... it is an 
important and valid concept, whose significance can only be adjudged 
by contrast with a situation from which it is (largely) absent'57). 
Like freedom itself, it is valued most when lost. 
On a practical level, a better understanding of the concept is impor-
tant in shaping both the general public's attitude and government 
policy toward the market mechanism. After being under heavy attack 
throughout the 1960's and 1970's, the market is going through a 
process of rehabilitation in the 1980's. As reasons for this we can 
mention the increasing evidence and better theoretical understanding 
of cases of 'government failure' and the stagnation and high rates of 
unemployment persisting in most Western 'mixed" economies. Even in the 
centrally-planned economies of" Eastern Europe various attempts have 
been made over the past two decades to introducé market elements in 
order to improve their economie efficiency. However, there is a strong 
presumption that the market is being rehabilitated for the purely 
pragmatic reason of puiling bureaucratised economies out of the quag-
mire of stagnation. It is far less accompanied by a renewed apprecia-
tion of the fundamental principles underlying market allocation. As a 
result, the present pro-market spirit prevailing in the West may only 
be temporary, to be discarded again when growth and employment figures 
have improved. The past denigration of the market may recur in future." 
If we want to avoid this, both the professional economists and the 
general public need a better understanding of the fundamental prin-
ciples underlying market and democratie political allocation. 
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